NATO military units generally lack independent capabilities for detecting and analyzing enemy jamming for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Instead, this capability is mostly centralized or supported by specialized units or agencies.
The agency responsible depends on the operational command structure and whether the intelligence needed is tactical, operational, or strategic. Outsourcing creates complexity, increases response time, and increases the number of people with access to sensitive information.
During a conflict, it is beneficial for planners to have real-time information on the location of the most significant source of jamming to mitigate the impact of disrupted communications.
By simulating multiple jamming sources and geolocating high-power transmitters during training and wargaming scenarios, commanders can better understand enemy capabilities, anticipate potential courses of action, and assess how environmental factors may affect operations.
The capability is also helpful in training situations for comms planners, who must decide on the optimal location for transmitters and manage frequencies for all organizational levels of a battlegroup.
In real-world scenarios, commanders can corroborate RF data with intelligence from multiple sources, such as satellite imagery. For example, an image of a suspected high-power jammer, which is confirmed to be emitting at a specific frequency, and located at a precise latitude and longitude, provides actionable, robust intelligence far greater than the sum of its parts.
In the video simulation (below), the hypothetical environment is in the Baltic region in Latvia. Suspected red forces are operating in the area, and blue forces are positioned to the west. Multiple electronic warfare installations are jamming signals across the L1, L2, L5, and E bands, denying access to several GNSS networks.
The simulation uses two RFeye Arrays to demonstrate how to geolocate these high-power transmitters and analyze their effects.
Before the simulation, CRFS RF engineers configured the target signals transmitted by red force jammers. These configurations involved identifying the relevant bands (e.g., L1, L2, L5, E6) based on anticipated enemy activity and operational intelligence. The parameters for these signals—the power levels, waveform, and modulation types—were input into the simulation software based on the known parameters of known electronic warfare installations. Additionally, the engineers virtually placed the jammers within the simulated environment.
Using the highly configurable RFeye Site to simulate and geolocate enemy jammers provides military planners and commanders with a practical tool for evaluating enemy capabilities and planning for real-world scenarios. The software allows users to practice the first three stages of the OODA loop.
Users can define transmitters and power levels and see how they are affected by topography to gain critical spectrum insights and ascertain electronic warfare's operational impact.
Applied to real-world contexts, this capability will allow individual units to gather their own real-time RF data to carry out robust IPB, protect critical comms and PNT systems, and neutralize RF jamming systems—without relying on outside agencies.
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RFeye Site Simulator provides EW operators with simulated RF sensors. This powerful tool can be used for teaching spectrum operations and conducting wargames, allowing EMSO professionals to simulate scenarios and resolve tactical problems.
Jaimie Brzezinski is Head of Content for CRFS. His specialty is turning highly technical ideas into engaging narratives. He has 15+ years of experience in writing technical content and building global teams of subject matter experts.